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and days is surely positive and probably very high. Individual differences in memory, in this test, are of approximately the same magnitude as in efficiency of observation, controlled association and selective thinking, and greater than in reaction time and sense discrimination.

Mr. H. N. Loomis reported his work on 'Reactions to Weights of Unequal Size.' The movements of the lifted weights, being graphically recorded, showed that, on first approaching the experiment, a person lifted the bulkier weight with the greater force; after repeated lifting this inequality decreased.

Professor James McKeen Cattell read a paper on 'Perceptions, Images and Illusions,' in which he emphasized, as important among the points of difference between a sensation and an image, the weaker tendency of the image to issue in motor reaction, and advanced a number of facts going to show that this relative lack of motor tendency was valuable in enabling us to distinguish images from sensations.

Professor W. P. Montague classified and criticized the various conceptions of truth as introductory to a view of 'Truth as Compossibility.'

R. S. WOODWORTH,
Secretary.

REVIEWS AND ABSTRACTS OF LITERATURE

The Persistent Problems of Philosophy. An Introduction to Metaphysics through the Study of Modern Systems. MARY WHITON CALKINS. New York: The Macmillan Co. 1907. Pp. xxii + 575.

The scope and purport of this interesting book can not be better stated than in the words of the writer: "I have . . . attempted to combine . . . what seem to me the essential features of a systematic introduction to metaphysics with those of a history of modern philosophy. . . . I hope . . . that certain features of the book may prove useful; in particular, the plan on which it classifies metaphysical systems, the summaries it offers as well of the arguments as of the conclusions of modern philosophers, the exact quotations and multiplied text references of its expositions. . . . In the main, this [the bibliographical and critical material] has been relegated, with the biographies, to the appendix of the book, that the continuity of metaphysical discussion may not be broken." So much from the preface; and then, as indicating the results attained, the noble statement with which the principal argument concludes: "We have ended one stage of our philosophic journey, for we have gained a vision of the truth as the monistic personalist sees it: the vision of a One which includes, without annihilating, the many, of an absolute self

who guarantees the individuality of the particular selves, of an eternity which transcends yet does not negate time, and of an immortality required by the deathless ideals of every moral self" (p. 455).

The type of thought is therefore evident. Miss Calkins's work is an introduction to metaphysics based on historical interpretation and leading to a systematic self-idealism. It is not an introduction to philosophy at large, for metaphysics, and metaphysics in the ultimate sense, forms its central theme, epistemology as well as the remaining philosophical disciplines receiving only incidental treatment. It is not 'introduction' in the sense of philosophical or even of metaphysical encyclopedia, but in the sense of outlines, a reasoned system being accepted with conviction and advocated with critical ability. It is based upon an extended expository study of leading philosophers from Descartes to Hegel, since, in spite of the recognized difficulties of such analysis, it is held that 'the historical sequence of philosophies from Descartes's to Hegel's, seems to coincide, roughly, with a logical order' (p. vii). In opposition to the phenomenalist and agnostic tendencies of the day, the writer is convinced of the possibility of metaphysical inquiry and the value of its outcome. Among its problems three are considered of the utmost importance: first, the conception of reality as one or many, 'numerical monism or pluralism,' as the contrasting systems are happily termed; second, the interpretation of reality as the same as or as unlike consciousness, idealism *versus* 'non-idealism'; third, the interpretation of idealism in terms of selfhood, 'spiritualistic or personal idealism' (pp. 9-10).

This analysis of doctrine implies the classification of systems. Metaphysical systems are both numerically and qualitatively pluralistic (Descartes, Locke), or numerically pluralistic and qualitatively monistic (Hobbes, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume); again, they are numerically monistic and qualitatively pluralistic (Spinoza), or both numerically and qualitatively monistic (Schopenhauer, Hegel); finally, of the qualitative monists Hobbes is non-idealistic, Hume is a phenomenalist idealist, Leibniz, Berkeley, Schopenhauer and Hegel are spiritualistic idealists. In general, this classification has unquestionable value, especially as it calls attention to the distinction, which is sometimes neglected, between qualitative and quantitative, or, as the writer better phrases it, numerical, monism. A question suggests itself, however, concerning the adequacy of the analysis. Does it fairly cover all 'the representative modern philosophers (through Hegel)' or even their strictly metaphysical conclusions? Professor Calkins explains the absence of Kant, Fichte and Schelling from her table 'on the ground that their systems, as internally inconsistent, fail to represent any one type of philosophy' (p. 10). But is not this tantamount to saying that the types of philosophy are too many and complex to be arranged according to any one principle of division? To the reviewer the conclusion seems evident, with regard either to metaphysical systems considered as such or to philosophical systems at large.

The historical and critical portions of the volume are written with a facile pen. Few recent treatises on philosophy have combined so constant reference to the sources with so readable an expository style. The writer exhibits, moreover, a comprehensive acquaintance with the history of modern thinking, at the same time that she exercises independent historical judgment. Suggestive, for example, is the classification of Spinoza as a qualitative pluralist because of his doctrine of the attributes (Chap. VIII., pp. 277, 288-293, 294-297), an interpretation which will be found of interest even by those who shall continue to adhere to the traditional view of the completeness of the Spinozistic monism. Less acceptable will prove the omission of Locke's work, considered as a repetition or restatement of the Cartesian dualism (pp. 111, 493); the failure to take adequate account of Berkeley's nominalism in Chapter V.; the depreciatory estimates of Kant (pp. 197-8, 272-3), etc., while as an example of minor corrigenda the restriction of Rousseau's principal works to the two 'Discourses' may be cited (p. 506). But the broader questions of interpretation lead into questions of doctrine as well. At this point unstinted commendation must be given to the spirit of Miss Calkins's work. Never has there been a fairer attempt to solve the difficult problem of evolving doctrine from historical analysis. Often the reader is warned in terms that the exposition of a given philosopher follows an order different from his own, or emphasizes positions which he himself did not consider of preeminent importance, or, as notably in regard to the 'phenomenalistic idealism' of Hume (Chap. VI.), includes principles which are logically implied in his own conclusions rather than advanced by him and definitely defended. Scientific conscientiousness is here complete, with in most instances results commensurate with the sincerity of the endeavor. Nevertheless, it is clear that in the end issues remain which may well be regarded in the future, as they have often been considered in the past, from points of view other than those which are adopted in the work before us. Many of these concern the central principles, idealism and selfhood. Thus in Chapter VI., which has just been mentioned, skeptical idealism is so firmly held inherent in Hume's system while, on the other hand, the existence of objects, even of finite selves and God, is evidently assumed in the course of his argument, that the hypothesis of bad faith is suggested as a solution of the contradiction (pp. 177-8, 191). Hegel supplies an example of the second problem; for in spite of such careful reasoning as that which is given in Chapter X. (especially pp. 382-389), it is possible still to question the analysis of the Hegelian absolute in terms of personal consciousness.

Concerning the systematic conclusions of the writer, judgment will also differ with the schools. It is at once refreshing and encouraging to find the self coming to its own again, after the dreary waste of philosophies, as well as psychologies 'without a soul.' And the fact gains in significance, when it is realized that it is psychologists of rank who are

anew emphasizing selfhood.¹ But will it not be necessary to give the doctrine the deepest possible grounding? And will it be possible to maintain the principle on the basis alone of immediate self-consciousness and the criticism of opposing positions (pp. 406-410 *et passim*)? Larger attempt is made to define the meaning of self and to meet the questions arising from the relations of the absolute self to the partial selves. In the final chapter this subject is developed in connection with contemporary discussions. Much in the spirit of Royce, the writer contends for the uniqueness and the inclusiveness of the absolute self in contrast to the 'pluralisms' of Howison, Rashdall and McTaggart. The problems which are involved in monism of this type are resolutely faced, and although it is not claimed that they are all elucidated, none are passed without careful consideration. In this way the argument advances from the existence of self, its nature and its relation to time, to the problem of freedom and the outlook toward immortality, concluding with the eloquent summary which has already been quoted.

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Ethical Aspects of Economics. W. R. SORLEY. *International Journal of Ethics*, Vol. XVII., Nos. 1 and 3. Pp. 1-13; 275-290.

In the days of Mill and Carlyle there was a bitter controversy between economists and moralists, which arose from the failure, or, at least, the seeming failure, of the economist to recognize the continuity of the economic life with its social environment. To-day a problem fronts both economist and moralist, which arises from the full recognition by the economist, as well as by the moralist, of that continuity which before was in question. The ethical aspects of economics are two: the first is the fact of that continuity just mentioned; the second is the problem that arises in and from that continuity.

Dealing with the first of these ethical aspects of economics, Mr. Sorley classifies the moral influences which enter into and modify the production and distribution and consumption of wealth under three heads: mental processes, the forms of social life, and the system of law declared and enforced by the state. In the first of these fields, for example, it is impossible to suppose man actuated merely by the desire for wealth even in the pursuit of wealth. On the contrary, that pursuit is largely actuated by motives that are ethical, by the sense of duty, and by ideas of good and evil. Economic facts are imbedded in a larger mass of facts, mental, social and legal, among all of which the ethical facts have an important place. The economic man or the economic state is a mere figment or hypothesis.

The second and more important ethical aspect of economics may be resolved into the relation which exists between the concept of value in exchange, or extrinsic worth, on the one hand, and worth proper, or intrinsic worth, on the other. The term *value*, as the economist uses it,

¹ Cf. with Miss Calkins's argument in this work and in her more distinctively psychological treatises, Chap. XII. in Judd's 'Psychology,' recently published.